A competitive partnership formation process

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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A competitive partnership formation process. / Andersson, Tommy; Gudmundsson, Jens; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu.

In: Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 86, 07.2014, p. 165-177.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Andersson, T, Gudmundsson, J, Talman, D & Yang, Z 2014, 'A competitive partnership formation process', Games and Economic Behaviour, vol. 86, pp. 165-177. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.009

APA

Andersson, T., Gudmundsson, J., Talman, D., & Yang, Z. (2014). A competitive partnership formation process. Games and Economic Behaviour, 86, 165-177. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.009

Vancouver

Andersson T, Gudmundsson J, Talman D, Yang Z. A competitive partnership formation process. Games and Economic Behaviour. 2014 Jul;86:165-177. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.009

Author

Andersson, Tommy ; Gudmundsson, Jens ; Talman, Dolf ; Yang, Zaifu. / A competitive partnership formation process. In: Games and Economic Behaviour. 2014 ; Vol. 86. pp. 165-177.

Bibtex - Download

@article{355cddae1c4343e5881f00d69617f011,
title = "A competitive partnership formation process",
abstract = "A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.",
keywords = "partnership formation, mechanism design, equilibrium, stability, assignment market",
author = "Tommy Andersson and Jens Gudmundsson and Dolf Talman and Zaifu Yang",
year = "2014",
month = "7",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.009",
language = "English",
volume = "86",
pages = "165--177",
journal = "Games and Economic Behaviour",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - A competitive partnership formation process

AU - Andersson, Tommy

AU - Gudmundsson, Jens

AU - Talman, Dolf

AU - Yang, Zaifu

PY - 2014/7

Y1 - 2014/7

N2 - A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.

AB - A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.

KW - partnership formation

KW - mechanism design

KW - equilibrium

KW - stability

KW - assignment market

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.009

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.009

M3 - Article

VL - 86

SP - 165

EP - 177

JO - Games and Economic Behaviour

JF - Games and Economic Behaviour

SN - 0899-8256

ER -