A pro tanto moral case for assisted death

Isra Black

A pro tanto moral case for assisted death

York Law School

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

This chapter makes a pro tanto case for the moral permissibility of assisted death. It is pro tanto in the sense that my principal interest is the all else being equal moral evaluation of the dimension of assisted death that comprises one individual, who wishes to die with assistance, and another, who either grants or refuses to grant the former’s wish and who provides assistance or does not provide assistance respectively. Put another way, this is not a case for assisted death all things considered. Specifically, I shall not consider the detail of other-regarding matters relevant to the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death. In making a pro tanto moral case for assisted death only, I have a substantive aim: to set out a universal foundation for the moral permissibility of assisted death, which in turn contributes to discussion of the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death, and which structures (in part) the institutionalisation of assisted death in law or policy.
I argue that, all else being equal, it is morally permissible for an agent to assist an individual to die just when their wish to die is autonomous and assisting their death is what an agent has most reason to do, where the latter is determined by the intrinsic values of the courses of action available to the agent in the individual’s regard. More formally, it is, all else being equal, morally permissible for Q to assist P to die if P’s decision to die is autonomous and Q has most reason to assist P’s death.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Death Rights
Subtitle of host publication	The Regulation of the Ending of Life
Editors	Sue Westwood
Publisher	Routledge
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 31 May 2020

Cite this

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title = "A pro tanto moral case for assisted death",

abstract = "This chapter makes a pro tanto case for the moral permissibility of assisted death. It is pro tanto in the sense that my principal interest is the all else being equal moral evaluation of the dimension of assisted death that comprises one individual, who wishes to die with assistance, and another, who either grants or refuses to grant the former{\textquoteright}s wish and who provides assistance or does not provide assistance respectively. Put another way, this is not a case for assisted death all things considered. Specifically, I shall not consider the detail of other-regarding matters relevant to the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death. In making a pro tanto moral case for assisted death only, I have a substantive aim: to set out a universal foundation for the moral permissibility of assisted death, which in turn contributes to discussion of the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death, and which structures (in part) the institutionalisation of assisted death in law or policy.I argue that, all else being equal, it is morally permissible for an agent to assist an individual to die just when their wish to die is autonomous and assisting their death is what an agent has most reason to do, where the latter is determined by the intrinsic values of the courses of action available to the agent in the individual{\textquoteright}s regard. More formally, it is, all else being equal, morally permissible for Q to assist P to die if P{\textquoteright}s decision to die is autonomous and Q has most reason to assist P{\textquoteright}s death.",

author = "Isra Black",

year = "2020",

month = may,

day = "31",

language = "English",

editor = "Sue Westwood",

booktitle = "Death Rights",

publisher = "Routledge",

address = "United Kingdom",

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TY - CHAP

T1 - A pro tanto moral case for assisted death

AU - Black, Isra

PY - 2020/5/31

Y1 - 2020/5/31

N2 - This chapter makes a pro tanto case for the moral permissibility of assisted death. It is pro tanto in the sense that my principal interest is the all else being equal moral evaluation of the dimension of assisted death that comprises one individual, who wishes to die with assistance, and another, who either grants or refuses to grant the former’s wish and who provides assistance or does not provide assistance respectively. Put another way, this is not a case for assisted death all things considered. Specifically, I shall not consider the detail of other-regarding matters relevant to the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death. In making a pro tanto moral case for assisted death only, I have a substantive aim: to set out a universal foundation for the moral permissibility of assisted death, which in turn contributes to discussion of the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death, and which structures (in part) the institutionalisation of assisted death in law or policy.I argue that, all else being equal, it is morally permissible for an agent to assist an individual to die just when their wish to die is autonomous and assisting their death is what an agent has most reason to do, where the latter is determined by the intrinsic values of the courses of action available to the agent in the individual’s regard. More formally, it is, all else being equal, morally permissible for Q to assist P to die if P’s decision to die is autonomous and Q has most reason to assist P’s death.

AB - This chapter makes a pro tanto case for the moral permissibility of assisted death. It is pro tanto in the sense that my principal interest is the all else being equal moral evaluation of the dimension of assisted death that comprises one individual, who wishes to die with assistance, and another, who either grants or refuses to grant the former’s wish and who provides assistance or does not provide assistance respectively. Put another way, this is not a case for assisted death all things considered. Specifically, I shall not consider the detail of other-regarding matters relevant to the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death. In making a pro tanto moral case for assisted death only, I have a substantive aim: to set out a universal foundation for the moral permissibility of assisted death, which in turn contributes to discussion of the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death, and which structures (in part) the institutionalisation of assisted death in law or policy.I argue that, all else being equal, it is morally permissible for an agent to assist an individual to die just when their wish to die is autonomous and assisting their death is what an agent has most reason to do, where the latter is determined by the intrinsic values of the courses of action available to the agent in the individual’s regard. More formally, it is, all else being equal, morally permissible for Q to assist P to die if P’s decision to die is autonomous and Q has most reason to assist P’s death.

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BT - Death Rights

A2 - Westwood, Sue

PB - Routledge

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