By the same authors

A pro tanto moral case for assisted death

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Author(s)

Department/unit(s)

Publication details

Title of host publicationDeath Rights
DateAccepted/In press - 31 May 2020
PublisherRoutledge
EditorsSue Westwood
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

This chapter makes a pro tanto case for the moral permissibility of assisted death. It is pro tanto in the sense that my principal interest is the all else being equal moral evaluation of the dimension of assisted death that comprises one individual, who wishes to die with assistance, and another, who either grants or refuses to grant the former’s wish and who provides assistance or does not provide assistance respectively. Put another way, this is not a case for assisted death all things considered. Specifically, I shall not consider the detail of other-regarding matters relevant to the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death. In making a pro tanto moral case for assisted death only, I have a substantive aim: to set out a universal foundation for the moral permissibility of assisted death, which in turn contributes to discussion of the all things considered moral permissibility of assisted death, and which structures (in part) the institutionalisation of assisted death in law or policy.
I argue that, all else being equal, it is morally permissible for an agent to assist an individual to die just when their wish to die is autonomous and assisting their death is what an agent has most reason to do, where the latter is determined by the intrinsic values of the courses of action available to the agent in the individual’s regard. More formally, it is, all else being equal, morally permissible for Q to assist P to die if P’s decision to die is autonomous and Q has most reason to assist P’s death.

Discover related content

Find related publications, people, projects, datasets and more using interactive charts.

View graph of relations