A reductio of coherentism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

An argument is presented which shows that coherence theories of justification are committed to a conception of epistemic support which conflicts with an axiom of probability theory.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)254-257
Number of pages4
JournalAnalysis
Volume67
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2007

Bibliographical note

© 2007 Tom Stoneham. This is an electronic version of an article published in Analysis, complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of Analysis, is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal's Blackwell website or at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com.

Keywords

  • Coherence theory of justification

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