Abstract
The relationship between illicit drugs and war has long captured attention. While scholars and policymakers often claim that involvement in the drug industry corrupts the politics of armed groups, rebel organizations argue that involvement in the drug industry is no different than other sources of funding. Based on fieldwork across multiple sites in Colombia, we argue that involvement in the drug industry does not necessarily have a depoliticizing effect on armed groups, while at the same time, taxing drugs is not a tax like any other. Drawing on original data including internal records, focus groups, interviews and other sources, we argue that the FARC-EPs drug taxation system needs to be understood as part of a broader 'wartime economic order.' We demonstrate that FARC-EP involvement in the drug industry triggered a series of specific effects deriving from the industry's illegal nature and lack of a regulatory framework. We find that the largest impact of narcotics has to do with rebel governance and wartime order. Regulating an economic activity that hundreds of thousands of people participated in helped the rebels consolidate their authority and gain legitimacy among its constituency. At the same time, the ideological and class dimensions of the rebels' taxation system also generated resistance from rival elites.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | International Politics |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 21 Sept 2023 |
Keywords
- War-time Economic Order
- rebel governance
- Colombia
- Illicit drugs
- taxation