An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple complements

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Standard

An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple complements. / Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu.

In: journal of Political Economy, Vol. 122, No. 2, 04.2014, p. 422-466.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Sun, N & Yang, Z 2014, 'An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple complements', journal of Political Economy, vol. 122, no. 2, pp. 422-466. https://doi.org/10.1086/674550

APA

Sun, N., & Yang, Z. (2014). An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple complements. journal of Political Economy, 122(2), 422-466. https://doi.org/10.1086/674550

Vancouver

Sun N, Yang Z. An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple complements. journal of Political Economy. 2014 Apr;122(2):422-466. https://doi.org/10.1086/674550

Author

Sun, Ning ; Yang, Zaifu. / An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple complements. In: journal of Political Economy. 2014 ; Vol. 122, No. 2. pp. 422-466.

Bibtex - Download

@article{21cfe1cf6afa47529a2b54d02907fc4f,
title = "An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple complements",
abstract = "This article proposes an efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for selling multiple complementary goods. The seller has reserve prices. The auctioneer announces a current price for every bundle of goods and a supply set of goods, every bidder responds with a set of goods demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts prices. We prove that even when bidders can exercise their market power strategically, this dynamic auction always induces them to bid truthfully, resulting in an efficient allocation, its supporting Walrasian equilibrium price for every bundle of goods, and a generalized VickreyClarke-Groves payment for every bidder.",
keywords = "auction design, Incomplete information, EFFICIENCY, dynamic auction, incentive, equilibrium",
author = "Ning Sun and Zaifu Yang",
year = "2014",
month = "4",
doi = "10.1086/674550",
language = "English",
volume = "122",
pages = "422--466",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0022-3808",
publisher = "University of Chicago",
number = "2",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple complements

AU - Sun, Ning

AU - Yang, Zaifu

PY - 2014/4

Y1 - 2014/4

N2 - This article proposes an efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for selling multiple complementary goods. The seller has reserve prices. The auctioneer announces a current price for every bundle of goods and a supply set of goods, every bidder responds with a set of goods demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts prices. We prove that even when bidders can exercise their market power strategically, this dynamic auction always induces them to bid truthfully, resulting in an efficient allocation, its supporting Walrasian equilibrium price for every bundle of goods, and a generalized VickreyClarke-Groves payment for every bidder.

AB - This article proposes an efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for selling multiple complementary goods. The seller has reserve prices. The auctioneer announces a current price for every bundle of goods and a supply set of goods, every bidder responds with a set of goods demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts prices. We prove that even when bidders can exercise their market power strategically, this dynamic auction always induces them to bid truthfully, resulting in an efficient allocation, its supporting Walrasian equilibrium price for every bundle of goods, and a generalized VickreyClarke-Groves payment for every bidder.

KW - auction design

KW - Incomplete information

KW - EFFICIENCY

KW - dynamic auction

KW - incentive

KW - equilibrium

U2 - 10.1086/674550

DO - 10.1086/674550

M3 - Article

VL - 122

SP - 422

EP - 466

JO - Journal of Political Economy

JF - Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0022-3808

IS - 2

ER -