An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders. / Talman, A. J. J.; Yang, Zaifu.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 44, No. 3, 08.2015, p. 769-784.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Talman, AJJ & Yang, Z 2015, 'An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 769-784. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0454-6

APA

Talman, A. J. J., & Yang, Z. (2015). An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders. International Journal of Game Theory, 44(3), 769-784. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0454-6

Vancouver

Talman AJJ, Yang Z. An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders. International Journal of Game Theory. 2015 Aug;44(3):769-784. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0454-6

Author

Talman, A. J. J. ; Yang, Zaifu. / An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 2015 ; Vol. 44, No. 3. pp. 769-784.

Bibtex - Download

@article{1a3daadfd6dd46f1b8c1ae8995816061,
title = "An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders",
abstract = "An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but may face a budget constraint and therefore be unable to pay up to his values. In such markets, a Walrasian equilibrium may fail to exist. We develop a novel dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core allocation. In the auction prices that have been increased can be later decreased if they have become too high. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector, achieves Pareto efficiency, and is robust against the threat of deviation by any coalition of market participants.",
keywords = "Dynamic auction, Multi-item auction, Budget constraint, Core, Efficiency",
author = "Talman, {A. J. J.} and Zaifu Yang",
year = "2015",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1007/s00182-014-0454-6",
language = "English",
volume = "44",
pages = "769--784",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
number = "3",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders

AU - Talman, A. J. J.

AU - Yang, Zaifu

PY - 2015/8

Y1 - 2015/8

N2 - An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but may face a budget constraint and therefore be unable to pay up to his values. In such markets, a Walrasian equilibrium may fail to exist. We develop a novel dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core allocation. In the auction prices that have been increased can be later decreased if they have become too high. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector, achieves Pareto efficiency, and is robust against the threat of deviation by any coalition of market participants.

AB - An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but may face a budget constraint and therefore be unable to pay up to his values. In such markets, a Walrasian equilibrium may fail to exist. We develop a novel dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core allocation. In the auction prices that have been increased can be later decreased if they have become too high. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector, achieves Pareto efficiency, and is robust against the threat of deviation by any coalition of market participants.

KW - Dynamic auction

KW - Multi-item auction

KW - Budget constraint

KW - Core

KW - Efficiency

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-014-0454-6

DO - 10.1007/s00182-014-0454-6

M3 - Article

VL - 44

SP - 769

EP - 784

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 3

ER -