An Existence Result for Farsighted Stable Sets of Games in Characteristic Function Form

A. Bhattacharya; V. Brosi

doi:10.1007/s00182-010-0262-6

An Existence Result for Farsighted Stable Sets of Games in Characteristic Function Form

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Abstract

In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form (not necessarily with side payments) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	393-401
Number of pages	8
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	40
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0262-6
Publication status	Published - May 2011

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http://www.springerlink.com/content/x4n6753622806038/

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title = "An Existence Result for Farsighted Stable Sets of Games in Characteristic Function Form",

abstract = "In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form (not necessarily with side payments) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.",

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An Existence Result for Farsighted Stable Sets of Games in Characteristic Function Form

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