The verification of safety-critical systems using formal techniques is not something new. Traditionally, safety-critical systems are verified using hazard analysis techniques, e.g., fault tree analysis. As safety-critical systems have become larger and more complex, several analysis techniques with compositional capabilities were developed. However, these techniques were not able to analyse stochastic systems. In this paper, we present a model-based compositional safety analysis technique (i.e., failure propagation analysis) and explore the feasibility of integrating this safety analysis technique with techniques of probabilistic model checking, more precisely the PRISM model checker. By doing so, we make it possible to rigorously verify a model while system failure behaviours are quantitatively analysed.
|Title of host publication
|Proceedings of the 2010 Fourth International Conference on Secure Software Integration and Reliability Improvement Companion (SSIRI-C)
|Number of pages
|Published - Jun 2010