Another Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims

Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof, Ema Louise Sullivan-Bissett

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David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich- Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim
approach remains to be answered.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)147-153
Number of pages6
JournalLogos and Episteme
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2017

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