Another Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims

Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof; Ema Louise Sullivan-Bissett

Another Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims

Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof, Ema Louise Sullivan-Bissett

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich- Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim
approach remains to be answered.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	147-153
Number of pages	6
Journal	Logos and Episteme
Volume	8
Issue number	3
Publication status	Published - 2017

Bibliographical note

© Logos & Episteme, 2017. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details

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Cite this

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abstract = "David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbj{\o}rn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens{\textquoteright}s objection. Here we reply to Steglich- Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens{\textquoteright}s challenge to the truth-aimapproach remains to be answered.",

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