As-if Trust

Alfred James Moore; Michael MacKenzie

doi:10.1080/13698230.2024.2423141

As-if Trust

Alfred James Moore, Michael MacKenzie

Politics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A lot of what we understand to be trust is not trust; it is, instead, an active and conscious decision to feign trust. We call this ‘as-if’ trust. If trust involves taking on risks and vulnerabilities, as-if trust involves taking on surplus risks and vulnerabilities. People may decide to act as if they trust in many situations, even when they do not have sufficient warrant to trust – which is to say even when they do not trust. Likewise, people might decide to act as if they trust even when they have good reasons to actively distrust. The surplus risks of as-if trust may be worth taking in a number of different contexts and for many reasons. We argue that as-if trust is a concept that should be added to our theoretical, practical, and political vocabularies of trust and distrust. In doing so, we discuss the main reasons for someone to act as if they trust. We then show that the practice of as-if trust has been recognized by other scholars but treated as trust. In response, we clarify how as-if trust differs from trust, and we discuss the utility and ubiquity of as-if trust, especially in politics.

Original language	English
Number of pages	22
Journal	Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2024.2423141
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 4 Nov 2024

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

10.1080/13698230.2024.2423141Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

MacKenzie and Moore 2024 As-if trust
© 2024 The Author(s
Final published version, 636 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "As-if Trust",

abstract = "A lot of what we understand to be trust is not trust; it is, instead, an active and conscious decision to feign trust. We call this {\textquoteleft}as-if{\textquoteright} trust. If trust involves taking on risks and vulnerabilities, as-if trust involves taking on surplus risks and vulnerabilities. People may decide to act as if they trust in many situations, even when they do not have sufficient warrant to trust – which is to say even when they do not trust. Likewise, people might decide to act as if they trust even when they have good reasons to actively distrust. The surplus risks of as-if trust may be worth taking in a number of different contexts and for many reasons. We argue that as-if trust is a concept that should be added to our theoretical, practical, and political vocabularies of trust and distrust. In doing so, we discuss the main reasons for someone to act as if they trust. We then show that the practice of as-if trust has been recognized by other scholars but treated as trust. In response, we clarify how as-if trust differs from trust, and we discuss the utility and ubiquity of as-if trust, especially in politics.",

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N2 - A lot of what we understand to be trust is not trust; it is, instead, an active and conscious decision to feign trust. We call this ‘as-if’ trust. If trust involves taking on risks and vulnerabilities, as-if trust involves taking on surplus risks and vulnerabilities. People may decide to act as if they trust in many situations, even when they do not have sufficient warrant to trust – which is to say even when they do not trust. Likewise, people might decide to act as if they trust even when they have good reasons to actively distrust. The surplus risks of as-if trust may be worth taking in a number of different contexts and for many reasons. We argue that as-if trust is a concept that should be added to our theoretical, practical, and political vocabularies of trust and distrust. In doing so, we discuss the main reasons for someone to act as if they trust. We then show that the practice of as-if trust has been recognized by other scholars but treated as trust. In response, we clarify how as-if trust differs from trust, and we discuss the utility and ubiquity of as-if trust, especially in politics.

AB - A lot of what we understand to be trust is not trust; it is, instead, an active and conscious decision to feign trust. We call this ‘as-if’ trust. If trust involves taking on risks and vulnerabilities, as-if trust involves taking on surplus risks and vulnerabilities. People may decide to act as if they trust in many situations, even when they do not have sufficient warrant to trust – which is to say even when they do not trust. Likewise, people might decide to act as if they trust even when they have good reasons to actively distrust. The surplus risks of as-if trust may be worth taking in a number of different contexts and for many reasons. We argue that as-if trust is a concept that should be added to our theoretical, practical, and political vocabularies of trust and distrust. In doing so, we discuss the main reasons for someone to act as if they trust. We then show that the practice of as-if trust has been recognized by other scholars but treated as trust. In response, we clarify how as-if trust differs from trust, and we discuss the utility and ubiquity of as-if trust, especially in politics.

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