Asymmetric federalism and economic voting

TY - JOUR

T1 - Asymmetric federalism and economic voting

AU - Leon-Alfonso, Sandra

AU - Orriols, Lluís

N1 - © 2016, European Consortium for Political Research. his is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

PY - 2016/10/10

Y1 - 2016/10/10

N2 - Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.

AB - Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.

KW - accountability

KW - clarity of responsibility

KW - elections

KW - federalism

KW - responsibility attribution

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84969833479&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/1475-6765.12148

DO - 10.1111/1475-6765.12148

M3 - Article

SN - 0304-4130

VL - 55

SP - 847

EP - 865

JO - European Journal of Political Research

JF - European Journal of Political Research

IS - 4

ER -