Abstract
The Uncontrollability thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible to consciously believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don’t work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability thesis is true or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further argue that the explanations don’t cut deep enough. Making the aim of truth internal to a state does not explain why we can’t produce at will states without this feature but sharing these states’ motivational role. I put forward a different explanation. I argue that consciousness makes manifest the attraction of the norm of truth. If we are consciously attending to the question of whether p, we cannot help but make a judgement in line with what the evidence gives us grounds for believing is true.
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 247-265 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2001 |