By the same authors

Breaking the Model: finalisation and a taxonomy of security attack

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Publication details

DatePublished - 2004
Number of pages20
PublisherDepartment of Computer Science, University of York
Original languageEnglish

Publication series

NameYork Computer Science Technical Report
PublisherDepartment of Computer Science, University of York
No.YCS-2004-371
VolumeYCS

Abstract

It is well known that security properties are not preserved by refinement, and that refinement can introduce new, covert, channels, such as timing channels. The finalisation step in refinement can be analysed to identify some of these channels, as unwanted finalisations that can break the assumptions of the formal model. We introduce a taxonomy of such unwanted finalisations, and give examples of attacks that exploit them.

Bibliographical note

Freely available.

    Research areas

  • Finalisation, Observed system, Security model assumptions

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