Breaking the Model: Finalisation and a Taxonomy of Security Attacks

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JournalElectronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
DatePublished - Jul 2005
Issue number2
Volume137
Number of pages18
Pages (from-to)225-242
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

It is well known that security properties are not preserved by refinement, and that refinement can introduce new, covert, channels, such as timing channels. The finalisation step in refinement can be analysed to identify some of these channels, as unwanted finalisations that can break the assumptions of the formal model. We introduce a taxonomy of such unwanted finalisations, and give examples of attacks that exploit them.

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    Research areas

  • Finalisation, observed system, security model assumptions

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