Abstract
The process of Brexit both before and after the triggering of Article 50 of the TEU, and subsequent discussion and preparation for the UK leaving the EU have been dominated by economic concerns regarding trade and the Single Market. This paper begins from the premise that the security cooperation angle, and in particular that relating to Common Security and Defence Policy and EU missions in respect of CSDP, should not be neglected.
CSDP has long been dependent on the contributions from France and the United Kingdom. They were the St Malo European Security and Defence Policy protagonists, and are the EU’s major defence spenders, as well as the only member states capable of power projection. So the implications for CSDP of a UK withdrawal from the Union are especially profound. The Leave campaign in the EU referendum argued that withdrawal from the Union would not compromise UK security, nor the UK contribution to European security. However the UK had already cooled towards CSDP. The UK often seemed a reluctant participant in the European Defence Agency and was a sceptical onlooker during the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The mood music from UK defence ministers since 2010 indicated a weakening of British interest in pan-European security, and Conservative instincts suggest that European Union engagement in this policy field is a threat to the integrity of NATO.
The paper considers the implications for CSDP of the UK decision to leave the EU, and secondly how an eventual Brexit will affect British security and defence cooperation with the EU and EU member states. It also asks to what extent are the security and defence implications of Brexit part of the UK’s Brexit planning before and after triggering Article 50.
CSDP has long been dependent on the contributions from France and the United Kingdom. They were the St Malo European Security and Defence Policy protagonists, and are the EU’s major defence spenders, as well as the only member states capable of power projection. So the implications for CSDP of a UK withdrawal from the Union are especially profound. The Leave campaign in the EU referendum argued that withdrawal from the Union would not compromise UK security, nor the UK contribution to European security. However the UK had already cooled towards CSDP. The UK often seemed a reluctant participant in the European Defence Agency and was a sceptical onlooker during the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The mood music from UK defence ministers since 2010 indicated a weakening of British interest in pan-European security, and Conservative instincts suggest that European Union engagement in this policy field is a threat to the integrity of NATO.
The paper considers the implications for CSDP of the UK decision to leave the EU, and secondly how an eventual Brexit will affect British security and defence cooperation with the EU and EU member states. It also asks to what extent are the security and defence implications of Brexit part of the UK’s Brexit planning before and after triggering Article 50.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | BISA Security Research Network |
| Publication status | Published - 19 Jan 2017 |
Keywords
- CSDP
- strategy
- Brexit
- EU Global Strategy