Bridging the Gap? Naive Realism and the Problem of Consciousness

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How should we decide between philosophical theories of perception? This paper addresses this question by considering the debate between naïve realists and their opponents, and in particular the claim that naïve realism provides a distinctive way of resolving the Problem of Consciousness. I argue that the naïve realist’s solution requires rejecting what many consider to be a ‘fixed point’ in theorizing about perception: a commitment to physicalism. In light of this, I consider different ways of understanding naïve realism and its motivation, suggesting that naïve realism might be best understood as a transcendental theory of perception.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPurpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception
EditorsHeather Logue, Louise Richardson
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages21
ISBN (Print)9780198853534
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jun 2021

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