Bridging the Gap? Naive Realism and the Problem of Consciousness

Keith Malcolm Allen

Bridging the Gap? Naive Realism and the Problem of Consciousness

Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

How should we decide between philosophical theories of perception? This paper addresses this question by considering the debate between naïve realists and their opponents, and in particular the claim that naïve realism provides a distinctive way of resolving the Problem of Consciousness. I argue that the naïve realist’s solution requires rejecting what many consider to be a ‘fixed point’ in theorizing about perception: a commitment to physicalism. In light of this, I consider different ways of understanding naïve realism and its motivation, suggesting that naïve realism might be best understood as a transcendental theory of perception.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception
Editors	Heather Logue, Louise Richardson
Place of Publication	New York
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	43-63
Number of pages	21
ISBN (Print)	9780198853534
Publication status	Published - 10 Jun 2021

Cite this

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title = "Bridging the Gap? Naive Realism and the Problem of Consciousness",

abstract = "How should we decide between philosophical theories of perception? This paper addresses this question by considering the debate between na{\"i}ve realists and their opponents, and in particular the claim that na{\"i}ve realism provides a distinctive way of resolving the Problem of Consciousness. I argue that the na{\"i}ve realist{\textquoteright}s solution requires rejecting what many consider to be a {\textquoteleft}fixed point{\textquoteright} in theorizing about perception: a commitment to physicalism. In light of this, I consider different ways of understanding na{\"i}ve realism and its motivation, suggesting that na{\"i}ve realism might be best understood as a transcendental theory of perception.",

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