By the same authors

Bridging the Gap? Naive Realism and the Problem of Consciousness

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Author(s)

Department/unit(s)

Publication details

Title of host publicationPurpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception
DatePublished - 10 Jun 2021
Pages43-63
Number of pages21
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of PublicationNew York
EditorsHeather Logue, Louise Richardson
Original languageEnglish
ISBN (Print)9780198853534

Abstract

How should we decide between philosophical theories of perception? This paper addresses this question by considering the debate between naïve realists and their opponents, and in particular the claim that naïve realism provides a distinctive way of resolving the Problem of Consciousness. I argue that the naïve realist’s solution requires rejecting what many consider to be a ‘fixed point’ in theorizing about perception: a commitment to physicalism. In light of this, I consider different ways of understanding naïve realism and its motivation, suggesting that naïve realism might be best understood as a transcendental theory of perception.

Discover related content

Find related publications, people, projects, datasets and more using interactive charts.

View graph of relations