Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence

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Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence. / De Luca, Giacomo Davide; Sekeris, Petros G.; Spengler, Dominic Emanuel.

In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 90, 07.2018, p. 342-359.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

De Luca, GD, Sekeris, PG & Spengler, DE 2018, 'Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 90, pp. 342-359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008

APA

De Luca, G. D., Sekeris, P. G., & Spengler, D. E. (2018). Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 90, 342-359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008

Vancouver

De Luca GD, Sekeris PG, Spengler DE. Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2018 Jul;90:342-359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008

Author

De Luca, Giacomo Davide ; Sekeris, Petros G. ; Spengler, Dominic Emanuel. / Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence. In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2018 ; Vol. 90. pp. 342-359.

Bibtex - Download

@article{78e3e430343b410fb734da4383e87bf5,
title = "Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence",
abstract = "In this paper we argue that natural resource conservation is jeopardised by the ability of users to resort to violence to appropriate resources when they become scarce. We provide evidence from a lab experiment that participants interacting in a dynamic game of common pool resource extraction reduce their cooperation on efficient levels of resource extraction when given the possibility to appropriate the resource at some cost, i.e. through conflict. Theoretically, cooperation is achievable via the threat of punishment strategies, which stop being subgame perfect in the presence of conflict. Accordingly we argue that the observed reduction of cooperation in the game's early stages in the lab is a consequence of participants (correctly) anticipating the use of appropriation when resources become scarce.",
keywords = "Cooperation, Dynamic game, Experiment, Natural resource exploitation",
author = "{De Luca}, {Giacomo Davide} and Sekeris, {Petros G.} and Spengler, {Dominic Emanuel}",
note = "{\textcopyright} 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher{\textquoteright}s self-archiving policy. ",
year = "2018",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
pages = "342--359",
journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management",
issn = "0095-0696",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence

AU - De Luca, Giacomo Davide

AU - Sekeris, Petros G.

AU - Spengler, Dominic Emanuel

N1 - © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy.

PY - 2018/7

Y1 - 2018/7

N2 - In this paper we argue that natural resource conservation is jeopardised by the ability of users to resort to violence to appropriate resources when they become scarce. We provide evidence from a lab experiment that participants interacting in a dynamic game of common pool resource extraction reduce their cooperation on efficient levels of resource extraction when given the possibility to appropriate the resource at some cost, i.e. through conflict. Theoretically, cooperation is achievable via the threat of punishment strategies, which stop being subgame perfect in the presence of conflict. Accordingly we argue that the observed reduction of cooperation in the game's early stages in the lab is a consequence of participants (correctly) anticipating the use of appropriation when resources become scarce.

AB - In this paper we argue that natural resource conservation is jeopardised by the ability of users to resort to violence to appropriate resources when they become scarce. We provide evidence from a lab experiment that participants interacting in a dynamic game of common pool resource extraction reduce their cooperation on efficient levels of resource extraction when given the possibility to appropriate the resource at some cost, i.e. through conflict. Theoretically, cooperation is achievable via the threat of punishment strategies, which stop being subgame perfect in the presence of conflict. Accordingly we argue that the observed reduction of cooperation in the game's early stages in the lab is a consequence of participants (correctly) anticipating the use of appropriation when resources become scarce.

KW - Cooperation

KW - Dynamic game

KW - Experiment

KW - Natural resource exploitation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050080456&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008

DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008

M3 - Article

VL - 90

SP - 342

EP - 359

JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

SN - 0095-0696

ER -