Choice of contracts for quality in health care: Evidence from the British NHS

E Fichera; Hugh Stanley Emrys Gravelle; M Pezzino; Matthew Sutton

Choice of contracts for quality in health care: Evidence from the British NHS

E Fichera, Hugh Stanley Emrys Gravelle, M Pezzino , Matthew Sutton

Centre for Health Economics

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/11, we find that the number of quality targets is determined by the purchaser's population health and its budget, the
hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	York, UK
Publisher	Centre for Health Economics, University of York
Number of pages	33
Publication status	Published - Jun 2013

Publication series

Name	CHE Research Paper
Publisher	Centre for Health Economics, University of York
No.	85

Bibliographical note

CHE Research Paper 85

Keywords

Contracts
quality
financial incentives
pay for performance
hospitals
Nash bargaining

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http://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHERP85_contract_choice_quality_healthcare_NHS.pdf

Cite this

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