Collingwood's Critique of Oxbridge Realism

Michael Anthony Beaney

Collingwood's Critique of Oxbridge Realism

Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed)

Abstract

In chapters 3 to 6 of his Autobiography, R. G. Collingwood attacks the views of those he calls ‘realists’, seen as led in Oxford by John Cook Wilson and in Cambridge by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Central to realism, as Collingwood characterizes it, are the doctrines that knowing is a simple ‘intuiting’ of reality and that knowing makes no difference to what is known, doctrines understood as grounded in the logic of propositions, and in particular, the assumption that the proposition is the unit of thought. Collingwood criticizes realism for ignoring history, and argues that the logic of propositions should be replaced by a logic of question and answer. In this chapter I elucidate and evaluate Collingwood’s critique.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	An Autobiography and Other Writings
Subtitle of host publication	With essays on Collingwood's life and work
Editors	Boucher David, Teresa Smith
Place of Publication	Oxford
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	247-69
Number of pages	23
ISBN (Print)	978–0–19–9658603–5
Publication status	Published - 27 Mar 2014

Keywords

Collingwood, Oxford realism, Cambridge realism

Cite this

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title = "Collingwood's Critique of Oxbridge Realism",

abstract = "In chapters 3 to 6 of his Autobiography, R. G. Collingwood attacks the views of those he calls {\textquoteleft}realists{\textquoteright}, seen as led in Oxford by John Cook Wilson and in Cambridge by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Central to realism, as Collingwood characterizes it, are the doctrines that knowing is a simple {\textquoteleft}intuiting{\textquoteright} of reality and that knowing makes no difference to what is known, doctrines understood as grounded in the logic of propositions, and in particular, the assumption that the proposition is the unit of thought. Collingwood criticizes realism for ignoring history, and argues that the logic of propositions should be replaced by a logic of question and answer. In this chapter I elucidate and evaluate Collingwood{\textquoteright}s critique.",

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N2 - In chapters 3 to 6 of his Autobiography, R. G. Collingwood attacks the views of those he calls ‘realists’, seen as led in Oxford by John Cook Wilson and in Cambridge by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Central to realism, as Collingwood characterizes it, are the doctrines that knowing is a simple ‘intuiting’ of reality and that knowing makes no difference to what is known, doctrines understood as grounded in the logic of propositions, and in particular, the assumption that the proposition is the unit of thought. Collingwood criticizes realism for ignoring history, and argues that the logic of propositions should be replaced by a logic of question and answer. In this chapter I elucidate and evaluate Collingwood’s critique.

AB - In chapters 3 to 6 of his Autobiography, R. G. Collingwood attacks the views of those he calls ‘realists’, seen as led in Oxford by John Cook Wilson and in Cambridge by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Central to realism, as Collingwood characterizes it, are the doctrines that knowing is a simple ‘intuiting’ of reality and that knowing makes no difference to what is known, doctrines understood as grounded in the logic of propositions, and in particular, the assumption that the proposition is the unit of thought. Collingwood criticizes realism for ignoring history, and argues that the logic of propositions should be replaced by a logic of question and answer. In this chapter I elucidate and evaluate Collingwood’s critique.

KW - Collingwood, Oxford realism, Cambridge realism

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

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EP - 269

BT - An Autobiography and Other Writings

A2 - David, Boucher

A2 - Smith, Teresa

PB - Oxford University Press

CY - Oxford

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