Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution: Composable security against coherent attacks

Cosmo Lupo; Carlo Ottaviani; Panagiotis Papanastasiou; Stefano Pirandola

doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.97.052327

Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution: Composable security against coherent attacks

Cosmo Lupo, Carlo Ottaviani, Panagiotis Papanastasiou, Stefano Pirandola

Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We present a rigorous security analysis of continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CVMDI QKD) in a finite-size scenario. The security proof is obtained in two steps: by first assessing the security against collective Gaussian attacks, and then extending to the most general class of coherent attacks via the Gaussian de Finetti reduction. Our result combines recent state-of-the-art security proofs for CVQKD with findings about min-entropy calculus and parameter estimation. In doing so, we improve the finite-size estimate of the secret key rate. Our conclusions confirm that CV MDI protocols allow for high rates on the metropolitan scale, and may achieve a nonzero secret key rate against the most general class of coherent attacks after 10^7–10^9 quantum signal transmissions, depending on loss and noise, and on the required level of security.

Original language	English
Article number	052327
Pages (from-to)	1-10
Number of pages	10
Journal	Physical Review A
Volume	97
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.97.052327
Publication status	Published - 29 May 2018

Bibliographical note

©2018 American Physical Society. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

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10.1103/PhysRevA.97.052327

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©2018 American Physical Society. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details
Accepted author manuscript, 241 KBLicence: Unspecified
PhysRevA.97.052327
©2018 American Physical Society.
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https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.07924

Cite this

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abstract = "We present a rigorous security analysis of continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CVMDI QKD) in a finite-size scenario. The security proof is obtained in two steps: by first assessing the security against collective Gaussian attacks, and then extending to the most general class of coherent attacks via the Gaussian de Finetti reduction. Our result combines recent state-of-the-art security proofs for CVQKD with findings about min-entropy calculus and parameter estimation. In doing so, we improve the finite-size estimate of the secret key rate. Our conclusions confirm that CV MDI protocols allow for high rates on the metropolitan scale, and may achieve a nonzero secret key rate against the most general class of coherent attacks after 10^7–10^9 quantum signal transmissions, depending on loss and noise, and on the required level of security.",

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