Cooperation and Risk sharing in Public-private Partnerships for the management in invasive species

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

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Cooperation and Risk sharing in Public-private Partnerships for the management in invasive species. / Mato Amboage, Rosa; Touza, Julia M.; Pitchford, Jon.

2015. Paper presented at BIOECON XVII Conference on Experimental Behavioural Economics and the Conservation of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Harvard

Mato Amboage, R, Touza, JM & Pitchford, J 2015, 'Cooperation and Risk sharing in Public-private Partnerships for the management in invasive species', Paper presented at BIOECON XVII Conference on Experimental Behavioural Economics and the Conservation of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 13/09/15 - 15/09/15.

APA

Mato Amboage, R., Touza, J. M., & Pitchford, J. (2015). Cooperation and Risk sharing in Public-private Partnerships for the management in invasive species. Paper presented at BIOECON XVII Conference on Experimental Behavioural Economics and the Conservation of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Vancouver

Mato Amboage R, Touza JM, Pitchford J. Cooperation and Risk sharing in Public-private Partnerships for the management in invasive species. 2015. Paper presented at BIOECON XVII Conference on Experimental Behavioural Economics and the Conservation of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Author

Mato Amboage, Rosa ; Touza, Julia M. ; Pitchford, Jon. / Cooperation and Risk sharing in Public-private Partnerships for the management in invasive species. Paper presented at BIOECON XVII Conference on Experimental Behavioural Economics and the Conservation of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Bibtex - Download

@conference{af5f0439b11744459f75d69f4ff29d89,
title = "Cooperation and Risk sharing in Public-private Partnerships for the management in invasive species",
abstract = "Developing incentives for private management efforts for preventing and controlling infectious diseases is a difficult challenge due to its public good nature. Furthermore, since budgets are limited, and the outcomes of prevention efforts are uncertain, resource managers tend to allocate funds to the most immediate and visible problems, often prioritizing post-incursion actions However, there is increasing evidence that focusing on prevention, including early detention and rapid action, is the most cost-effective approach to mitigating the impacts of invasive species. In this paper, we focus on cost-sharing agreements as one of the instruments available for invasive species management, which corrects for the coordination of private biosecurity efforts and encourages early action. We develop a theoretical contract theory framework to understand whether government funds can spread the risk across signatory private agents, and whether agents have incentives to cooperate in biosecurity actions with each other if the compensation mechanism depends not only in one{\textquoteright}s actions but on everyone else{\textquoteright}s efforts. We find that when the responsibility of biosecurity actions is shared across private agents, funding from the public sector can be used to encourage cooperation, higher private investments in biosecurity, and private agents face lower risk. ",
author = "{Mato Amboage}, Rosa and Touza, {Julia M.} and Jon Pitchford",
year = "2015",
language = "English",
note = "BIOECON XVII Conference on Experimental Behavioural Economics and the Conservation of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services ; Conference date: 13-09-2015 Through 15-09-2015",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - CONF

T1 - Cooperation and Risk sharing in Public-private Partnerships for the management in invasive species

AU - Mato Amboage, Rosa

AU - Touza, Julia M.

AU - Pitchford, Jon

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Developing incentives for private management efforts for preventing and controlling infectious diseases is a difficult challenge due to its public good nature. Furthermore, since budgets are limited, and the outcomes of prevention efforts are uncertain, resource managers tend to allocate funds to the most immediate and visible problems, often prioritizing post-incursion actions However, there is increasing evidence that focusing on prevention, including early detention and rapid action, is the most cost-effective approach to mitigating the impacts of invasive species. In this paper, we focus on cost-sharing agreements as one of the instruments available for invasive species management, which corrects for the coordination of private biosecurity efforts and encourages early action. We develop a theoretical contract theory framework to understand whether government funds can spread the risk across signatory private agents, and whether agents have incentives to cooperate in biosecurity actions with each other if the compensation mechanism depends not only in one’s actions but on everyone else’s efforts. We find that when the responsibility of biosecurity actions is shared across private agents, funding from the public sector can be used to encourage cooperation, higher private investments in biosecurity, and private agents face lower risk.

AB - Developing incentives for private management efforts for preventing and controlling infectious diseases is a difficult challenge due to its public good nature. Furthermore, since budgets are limited, and the outcomes of prevention efforts are uncertain, resource managers tend to allocate funds to the most immediate and visible problems, often prioritizing post-incursion actions However, there is increasing evidence that focusing on prevention, including early detention and rapid action, is the most cost-effective approach to mitigating the impacts of invasive species. In this paper, we focus on cost-sharing agreements as one of the instruments available for invasive species management, which corrects for the coordination of private biosecurity efforts and encourages early action. We develop a theoretical contract theory framework to understand whether government funds can spread the risk across signatory private agents, and whether agents have incentives to cooperate in biosecurity actions with each other if the compensation mechanism depends not only in one’s actions but on everyone else’s efforts. We find that when the responsibility of biosecurity actions is shared across private agents, funding from the public sector can be used to encourage cooperation, higher private investments in biosecurity, and private agents face lower risk.

UR - http://bioecon-network.org/pages/17th_2015/papers17.html

M3 - Paper

T2 - BIOECON XVII Conference on Experimental Behavioural Economics and the Conservation of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services

Y2 - 13 September 2015 through 15 September 2015

ER -