Coordinating a closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns through variable-weighted Shapley values

Xiao-Xue Zheng; Deng-Feng Li; Zhi Liu; Fu Jia; Jiuh-Biing Sheu

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2019.04.006

Coordinating a closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns through variable-weighted Shapley values

Xiao-Xue Zheng, Deng-Feng Li, Zhi Liu, Fu Jia, Jiuh-Biing Sheu

Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) structure in which a manufacturer allows a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer to sell and remanufacture his products, respectively. Given the retailer’s distributional fairness concerns, we investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions and profits under five non-cooperative and cooperative game models, and focus on how to allocate maximum profit in a centralized setting. Based on the classic Shapley value, we propose an innovative weighted allocation approach-namely, the variable-weighted Shapley value-to coordinate this CLSC. Numerical studies demonstrate that when remanufactured products are lowly accepted by consumers, our model outperforms the classic Shapley value.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	227
Number of pages	253
Journal	Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Volume	126
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2019.04.006
Publication status	Published - 6 May 2019

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10.1016/j.tre.2019.04.006

Cite this

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title = "Coordinating a closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns through variable-weighted Shapley values",

abstract = "This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) structure in which a manufacturer allows a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer to sell and remanufacture his products, respectively. Given the retailer{\textquoteright}s distributional fairness concerns, we investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions and profits under five non-cooperative and cooperative game models, and focus on how to allocate maximum profit in a centralized setting. Based on the classic Shapley value, we propose an innovative weighted allocation approach-namely, the variable-weighted Shapley value-to coordinate this CLSC. Numerical studies demonstrate that when remanufactured products are lowly accepted by consumers, our model outperforms the classic Shapley value.",

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AU - Zheng, Xiao-Xue

AU - Li, Deng-Feng

AU - Liu, Zhi

AU - Jia, Fu

AU - Sheu, Jiuh-Biing

PY - 2019/5/6

Y1 - 2019/5/6

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AB - This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) structure in which a manufacturer allows a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer to sell and remanufacture his products, respectively. Given the retailer’s distributional fairness concerns, we investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions and profits under five non-cooperative and cooperative game models, and focus on how to allocate maximum profit in a centralized setting. Based on the classic Shapley value, we propose an innovative weighted allocation approach-namely, the variable-weighted Shapley value-to coordinate this CLSC. Numerical studies demonstrate that when remanufactured products are lowly accepted by consumers, our model outperforms the classic Shapley value.

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DO - 10.1016/j.tre.2019.04.006

M3 - Article

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JO - Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review

JF - Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review

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