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Costly Concessions: An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility

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Costly Concessions : An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility. / Weber, Simon; Galichon, Alfred; Kominers, Scott.

In: Journal of Political Economy , 12.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Weber, S, Galichon, A & Kominers, S 2019, 'Costly Concessions: An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility', Journal of Political Economy . https://doi.org/10.1086/702020

APA

Weber, S., Galichon, A., & Kominers, S. (2019). Costly Concessions: An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility. Journal of Political Economy . https://doi.org/10.1086/702020

Vancouver

Weber S, Galichon A, Kominers S. Costly Concessions: An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility. Journal of Political Economy . 2019 Dec. https://doi.org/10.1086/702020

Author

Weber, Simon ; Galichon, Alfred ; Kominers, Scott. / Costly Concessions : An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility. In: Journal of Political Economy . 2019.

Bibtex - Download

@article{9c94b885bd844847a4f58c7916d42bfd,
title = "Costly Concessions: An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility",
abstract = "We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectlytransferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classical fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers. We allow for the introduction of a general class of additive unobserved heterogeneity on agents’ preferences. We show existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under minimal assumptions. We then provide two algorithms to compute the equilibrium in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences; the second is more efficient, but applies only in the case in which random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a simple expression and we compute its derivatives. An empirical illustration is providedin the appendix.",
author = "Simon Weber and Alfred Galichon and Scott Kominers",
year = "2019",
month = "12",
doi = "10.1086/702020",
language = "English",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0022-3808",
publisher = "University of Chicago",

}

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Costly Concessions

T2 - An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility

AU - Weber, Simon

AU - Galichon, Alfred

AU - Kominers, Scott

PY - 2019/12

Y1 - 2019/12

N2 - We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectlytransferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classical fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers. We allow for the introduction of a general class of additive unobserved heterogeneity on agents’ preferences. We show existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under minimal assumptions. We then provide two algorithms to compute the equilibrium in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences; the second is more efficient, but applies only in the case in which random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a simple expression and we compute its derivatives. An empirical illustration is providedin the appendix.

AB - We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectlytransferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classical fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers. We allow for the introduction of a general class of additive unobserved heterogeneity on agents’ preferences. We show existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under minimal assumptions. We then provide two algorithms to compute the equilibrium in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences; the second is more efficient, but applies only in the case in which random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a simple expression and we compute its derivatives. An empirical illustration is providedin the appendix.

U2 - 10.1086/702020

DO - 10.1086/702020

M3 - Article

JO - Journal of Political Economy

JF - Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0022-3808

ER -