Counterfactuals, Causation and Humean Supervenience

TY - CHAP

T1 - Counterfactuals, Causation and Humean Supervenience

AU - Noordhof, Paul Jonathan Pitt

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - Counterfactual theories of causation are standardly put forward by proponents of the doctrine of Humean Supervenience. Nevertheless, the plausibility of such counterfactual theories does not rely upon, nor does it entail, the truth of Humean Supervenience. To illustrate the significance of these points, I consider three problem areas for the counterfactual theory of causation arising from the key component in evaluating its success: the semantics of the counterfactuals constituting the analysis. The first is the future similarity objection. The second relates to the connection between counterfactuals and chance. The third concerns the relationship between counterfactual asymmetry and causal asymmetry. In response to the first two difficulties, I place a constraint upon Lewis’s perfect match condition for the similarity weighting for counterfactuals and recommend appealing, more generally, to the idea of failure of fit rather than law violation in formulating the conditions. I explain how the constraint is motivated, and distinguished from something stronger that applies in certain contexts, and not others, by considering the connection between chance and frequency. I argue that the combination of this solution to the first two problems and recognition of the, at best, contingent truth of the doctrine of Humean Supervenience provides a successful treatment of the third problem. I draw out the methodological implications of my approach both with regard to the traditional aims of analysis and, more particularly, with regard to the proper understanding of the aims of counterfactual analyses of causation in the final section of the chapter.

AB - Counterfactual theories of causation are standardly put forward by proponents of the doctrine of Humean Supervenience. Nevertheless, the plausibility of such counterfactual theories does not rely upon, nor does it entail, the truth of Humean Supervenience. To illustrate the significance of these points, I consider three problem areas for the counterfactual theory of causation arising from the key component in evaluating its success: the semantics of the counterfactuals constituting the analysis. The first is the future similarity objection. The second relates to the connection between counterfactuals and chance. The third concerns the relationship between counterfactual asymmetry and causal asymmetry. In response to the first two difficulties, I place a constraint upon Lewis’s perfect match condition for the similarity weighting for counterfactuals and recommend appealing, more generally, to the idea of failure of fit rather than law violation in formulating the conditions. I explain how the constraint is motivated, and distinguished from something stronger that applies in certain contexts, and not others, by considering the connection between chance and frequency. I argue that the combination of this solution to the first two problems and recognition of the, at best, contingent truth of the doctrine of Humean Supervenience provides a successful treatment of the third problem. I draw out the methodological implications of my approach both with regard to the traditional aims of analysis and, more particularly, with regard to the proper understanding of the aims of counterfactual analyses of causation in the final section of the chapter.

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 13 978-981-4295-81-9

SP - 167

EP - 206

BT - Worldviews, Science and Us

A2 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht

A2 - D'Hooghe, Bart

PB - World Scientific Publishing

CY - Singapore

ER -