Critical Review of Eleonore Stump's Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the problem of suffering

TY - JOUR

T1 - Critical Review of Eleonore Stump's Wandering in Darkness

T2 - Narrative and the problem of suffering

AU - Efird, David

AU - Worsley, David Andrew

PY - 2015/7

Y1 - 2015/7

N2 - In her widely acclaimed Wandering in Darkness, Stump (2010) argues that the suffering of mentally fully functioning adult humans can be explained by God's love for them, a love which consists of a twofold desire for their good and for union with them. This love, then, constitutes a morally sufficient reason for God's allowing suffering, even horrendous suffering, and so serves either as a defence against the evidential problem of evil or a theodicy, depending on whether one takes the conditions described in the account to be either actual or merely possible.1 (Adopting the weaker assumption, we will take Stump's account to be a defence, though nothing hangs on this.) In what follows, we will summarize Stump's defence, what we take to be the strongest objection to it, namely, Draper's (2011) objection concerning the role of consent in suffering for some future benefit, and how she might reply to it.2 We will conclude with what we take to be the lessons of the debate, namely, lessons concerning the processes of justification and of sanctification and their limits.547

AB - In her widely acclaimed Wandering in Darkness, Stump (2010) argues that the suffering of mentally fully functioning adult humans can be explained by God's love for them, a love which consists of a twofold desire for their good and for union with them. This love, then, constitutes a morally sufficient reason for God's allowing suffering, even horrendous suffering, and so serves either as a defence against the evidential problem of evil or a theodicy, depending on whether one takes the conditions described in the account to be either actual or merely possible.1 (Adopting the weaker assumption, we will take Stump's account to be a defence, though nothing hangs on this.) In what follows, we will summarize Stump's defence, what we take to be the strongest objection to it, namely, Draper's (2011) objection concerning the role of consent in suffering for some future benefit, and how she might reply to it.2 We will conclude with what we take to be the lessons of the debate, namely, lessons concerning the processes of justification and of sanctification and their limits.547

KW - Problem of Evil

UR - http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/content/65/260/547

U2 - 10.1093/pq/pqv002

DO - 10.1093/pq/pqv002

M3 - Comment/debate

SN - 0031-8094

VL - 65

SP - 547

EP - 558

JO - Philosophical quarterly

JF - Philosophical quarterly

IS - 260

ER -