Activities per year
Abstract
Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1083-1103 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Canadian journal of philosophy |
Volume | 49 |
Issue number | 8 |
Early online date | 1 Mar 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2020 |
Bibliographical note
© 2019 Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.Keywords
- Hume’s principle
- Mathematics
- evolutionary debunking
- metaethics
- supervenience
Profiles
Activities
- 3 Invited talk
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Midlands Logic Seminar, University of Birmingham
Mary Leng (Speaker)
6 Dec 2017Activity: Talk or presentation › Invited talk
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Debunking Arguments in Mathematics and Ethics
Mary Leng (Invited speaker)
2 Mar 2017Activity: Talk or presentation › Invited talk
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Debunking Arguments in Mathematics and Ethics
Mary Leng (Invited speaker)
8 Nov 2016Activity: Talk or presentation › Invited talk
Projects
- 1 Finished
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Mathematics, Morals, and the Challenge to Physicalism
1/09/16 → 30/09/17
Project: Research project (funded) › Research