Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4: Towards Evidence-Based Safety Standards

Catherine Menon; Richard Hawkins; John McDermid

doi:10.1007/978-1-84882-349-5_15

Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4: Towards Evidence-Based Safety Standards

Catherine Menon, Richard Hawkins, John McDermid

Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4 is goal-based, and requires system developers to demonstrate how they have achieved safety. To this end, evidence is used to support claims relating to software safety. One of the most subtle questions when constructing a safety argument is the determination of whether the evidence presented is sufficient to assure the safety of the system to the level required. This paper presents a framework for assessing the assurance of evidence and claims. We also present a vocabulary for discussing factors which influence assurance. This framework and vocabulary together enable us to construct and discuss safety arguments for software. Using this framework and vocabulary, we present some sample discussions which demonstrate how the factors influencing assurance can interact.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Safety-Critical Systems: Problems, Process and Practice
Subtitle of host publication	Proceedings of the Seventeenth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium Brighton, UK, 3 - 5 February 2009
Editors	C Dale, T Anderson
Publisher	Springer
Pages	223-243
Number of pages	21
ISBN (Print)	978-1-84882-348-8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-349-5_15
Publication status	Published - 2009
Event	17th Safety-Critical Systems Symposium - Brighton Duration: 3 Feb 2009 → 5 Feb 2009

Conference

Conference	17th Safety-Critical Systems Symposium
City	Brighton
Period	3/02/09 → 5/02/09

Access to Document

10.1007/978-1-84882-349-5_15

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-349-5_15

Cite this

Menon, C., Hawkins, R., & McDermid, J. (2009). Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4: Towards Evidence-Based Safety Standards. In C. Dale, & T. Anderson (Eds.), Safety-Critical Systems: Problems, Process and Practice: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium Brighton, UK, 3 - 5 February 2009 (pp. 223-243). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-349-5_15

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title = "Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4: Towards Evidence-Based Safety Standards",

abstract = "Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4 is goal-based, and requires system developers to demonstrate how they have achieved safety. To this end, evidence is used to support claims relating to software safety. One of the most subtle questions when constructing a safety argument is the determination of whether the evidence presented is sufficient to assure the safety of the system to the level required. This paper presents a framework for assessing the assurance of evidence and claims. We also present a vocabulary for discussing factors which influence assurance. This framework and vocabulary together enable us to construct and discuss safety arguments for software. Using this framework and vocabulary, we present some sample discussions which demonstrate how the factors influencing assurance can interact.",

author = "Catherine Menon and Richard Hawkins and John McDermid",

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note = "17th Safety-Critical Systems Symposium ; Conference date: 03-02-2009 Through 05-02-2009",

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Menon, C, Hawkins, R & McDermid, J 2009, Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4: Towards Evidence-Based Safety Standards. in C Dale & T Anderson (eds), Safety-Critical Systems: Problems, Process and Practice: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium Brighton, UK, 3 - 5 February 2009 . Springer, pp. 223-243, 17th Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Brighton, 3/02/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-349-5_15

Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4: Towards Evidence-Based Safety Standards. / Menon, Catherine; Hawkins, Richard ; McDermid, John.
Safety-Critical Systems: Problems, Process and Practice: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium Brighton, UK, 3 - 5 February 2009 . ed. / C Dale; T Anderson. Springer, 2009. p. 223-243.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

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