Delusion and Doxasticism

Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof

Delusion and Doxasticism

Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed) › peer-review

Abstract

The chapter focuses on whether one should be doxasticist about delusion. It has the following structure. First, we will consider the nature of belief. The conclusion of this section is that a particular type of functional theory is to be preferred (independently of a commitment to physicalism or functionalism generally). In the second section, we will outline the arguments that have been offered against delusions involving beliefs and explain how the functional theory may deal with them without any substantial adjustment. The conclusion will be that the general arguments against delusions involving beliefs don’t work although there may be cases in which there are no grounds for attributing to a subject a belief with delusion-characterising content.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion
Editors	Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Publisher	Routledge
Chapter	19
Pages	292-307
Number of pages	15
ISBN (Print)	9781032283388
Publication status	Published - 15 Nov 2024

Bibliographical note

This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

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Paul Noordhof 19 Doxasticism and Delusion (Purecopy)
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AB - The chapter focuses on whether one should be doxasticist about delusion. It has the following structure. First, we will consider the nature of belief. The conclusion of this section is that a particular type of functional theory is to be preferred (independently of a commitment to physicalism or functionalism generally). In the second section, we will outline the arguments that have been offered against delusions involving beliefs and explain how the functional theory may deal with them without any substantial adjustment. The conclusion will be that the general arguments against delusions involving beliefs don’t work although there may be cases in which there are no grounds for attributing to a subject a belief with delusion-characterising content.

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Delusion and Doxasticism

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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