Abstract
The idea that there might be democratic forms of non-participation has been largely overlooked in the theoretical and empirical literature on democracy. Non-participation has variously been seen as a threat to the proper functioning of democracy, a rational choice, or (more rarely) as potentially beneficial at the systems level. We argue that there are forms of non-participation that may be justified on democratic grounds. Our main theoretical move is to distinguish between reflectivity (or thoughtfulness) and participation. We argue that the normative value of both participation and non-participation is conditioned by reflectivity, such that there may be democratically desirable forms of reflective non-participation. To support our claims, we provide examples of how non-participation can help support democratic goods — such as inclusion, influence, and legitimacy — that are normally associated only with democratic participation.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Polity |
Early online date | 10 Jun 2020 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 10 Jun 2020 |
Bibliographical note
This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.Keywords
- Democratic Theory
- Participation
- Non-Participation
- Deliberative Democracy
- Protest