Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument

Carl Johan Eric Gustafsson

doi:10.1093/analys/anz048

Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument

Carl Johan Eric Gustafsson

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Daniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher Taylor, he claims to have shown that the argument is based on a failure to understand Logic 101. Given a fairly plausible account of having the power to cause something, they claim that an inference rule that the argument relies on is invalid. In this paper, I show that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of the Consequence Argument. Hence Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation fails.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-8
Number of pages	8
Journal	Analysis
Early online date	22 Jan 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz048
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 22 Jan 2020

Bibliographical note

The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

Access to Document

10.1093/analys/anz048

Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument
The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.
Accepted author manuscript, 83.7 KB

Cite this

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