Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument

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Daniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher Taylor, he claims to have shown that the argument is based on a failure to understand Logic 101. Given a fairly plausible account of having the power to cause something, they claim that an inference rule that the argument relies on is invalid. In this paper, I show that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of the Consequence Argument. Hence Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation fails.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-8
Number of pages8
Early online date22 Jan 2020
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 22 Jan 2020

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The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

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