Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Author(s)

Department/unit(s)

Publication details

JournalAnalysis
DateAccepted/In press - 2 Jun 2019
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

Daniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher Taylor, he claims to have shown that the argument is based on a failure to understand Logic 101. Given a fairly plausible account of having the power to cause something, they claim that an inference rule that the argument relies on is invalid. In this paper, I show that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of the Consequence Argument. Hence Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation fails.

Discover related content

Find related publications, people, projects, datasets and more using interactive charts.

View graph of relations