Deterrence in Contests

Giacomo Davide De Luca; Petros G. Sekeris

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2012.00940.x

Deterrence in Contests

Giacomo Davide De Luca, Petros G. Sekeris

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper explores the role of deterrence in contests. As a general rule, we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents, it is necessary that the contest be destructive. We show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist. A corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions, agents should always be expected to engage in contests. Applied to international relations, our results imply that war is always a potential outcome despite deterrence attempts.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	171-189
Number of pages	19
Journal	Economica
Volume	80
Issue number	317
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2012.00940.x
Publication status	Published - Jan 2013

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http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2012.00940.x/abstract

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Deterrence in Contests

Abstract

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