Abstract
This paper argues that central governments can avoid blame for cuts to social security by transferring discretionary powers to local authorities. When making reductions to entitlements, conferring discretion avoids delineating the boundary of who is affected, allowing: for conflicts at the heart of policy formation to be deliberately fudged; decisions to be shielded from the gaze of the public and the courts; and responsibility for the impact of budget reductions to be externalised. Using three ‘welfare reforms’ in the UK as examples – the council tax reduction scheme, discretionary housing payments, and local welfare assistance schemes – four ‘blame avoidance’ functions of conferring discretion are proposed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 41-60 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Journal of Poverty and Social Justice |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 15 Feb 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 28 Feb 2019 |
Bibliographical note
© Policy Press 2019. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.Keywords
- welfare reform
- SOCIAL SECURITY
- DISCRETION
- Discretionary Housing Payments
- discretionary housing payments, discretion, local authority, local government law
