Disjunctive Permissions and Epistemic Modality

David Efird

Disjunctive Permissions and Epistemic Modality

Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed)

Abstract

I argue that Stephen Yablo's unified semantics of the deontic and the epistemic senses of 'may' is inadequate for sentences containing both these senses of 'may'.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Modality
Subtitle of host publication	Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology
Editors	Bob Hale, Aviv Hoffman
Place of Publication	Oxford
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	253-256
Number of pages	4
ISBN (Print)	978-0-19-956581-8
Publication status	Published - 2010

Cite this

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title = "Disjunctive Permissions and Epistemic Modality",

abstract = "I argue that Stephen Yablo's unified semantics of the deontic and the epistemic senses of 'may' is inadequate for sentences containing both these senses of 'may'.",

author = "David Efird",

year = "2010",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-0-19-956581-8",

pages = "253--256",

editor = "Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffman",

booktitle = "Modality",

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address = "United Kingdom",

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T1 - Disjunctive Permissions and Epistemic Modality

AU - Efird, David

PY - 2010

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AB - I argue that Stephen Yablo's unified semantics of the deontic and the epistemic senses of 'may' is inadequate for sentences containing both these senses of 'may'.

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 978-0-19-956581-8

SP - 253

EP - 256

BT - Modality

A2 - Hale, Bob

A2 - Hoffman, Aviv

PB - Oxford University Press

CY - Oxford

ER -