Doctor behaviour under a pay for performance contract: Further evidence from the quality and outcomes framework

H. Gravelle, M. Sutton, A. Ma

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

Since 2003, 25% of UK general practitioners’ income has been determined by the quality of their care. The 65 clinical quality indicators in this scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) are in the form of ratios, with financial reward increasing linearly with the ratio between a lower and upper threshold. The numerator is the number of patients for whom an indicator is achieved and the
denominator is the number of patients the practices declare are suitable for the indicator. The number declared suitable is the number of patients with the relevant condition less the number exception reported by the practice for a specified range of reasons. Exception reporting is designed to avoid harmful treatment resulting from the application of quality targets to patients for whom they were not intended. However, exception reporting also gives GPs the opportunity to exclude patients who should in fact be treated in order to achieve higher financial rewards. This is inappropriate use of exception reporting or ‘gaming’. Practices can also increase income if they are below the upper
threshold by reducing the number of patients declared with a condition (prevalence), or by increasing reported prevalence if they were above the upper threshold. This study examines the factors affecting delivered quality (the proportion of prevalent patients for indicators were achieved) and tests for
gaming of exceptions and for prevalence reporting being responsive to financial incentives.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationYork, UK
PublisherCentre for Health Economics, University of York
Number of pages39
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCHE Research Paper
PublisherCentre for Health Economics, University of York
No.34

Cite this