Does the Collapsing Principle Rule Out Borderline Cases?

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If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a corresponding comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative relations, John Broome's Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward two counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. In this article, I argue that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I also argue that the principle is implausible.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)483-492
Number of pages10
Issue number4
Early online date29 Apr 2018
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2018

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