Abstract
If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a corresponding comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative relations, John Broome's Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward two counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. In this article, I argue that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I also argue that the principle is implausible.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 483-492 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Utilitas |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 29 Apr 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2018 |
Bibliographical note
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