Does the Collapsing Principle Rule Out Borderline Cases?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Full text download(s)

Published copy (DOI)

Author(s)

Department/unit(s)

Publication details

JournalUtilitas
DateE-pub ahead of print - 29 Apr 2018
DatePublished (current) - Dec 2018
Issue number4
Volume30
Pages (from-to)483-492
Early online date29/04/18
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a corresponding comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative relations, John Broome's Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward two counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. In this article, I argue that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I also argue that the principle is implausible.

Discover related content

Find related publications, people, projects, datasets and more using interactive charts.

View graph of relations