By the same authors

DRE-ip: A Verifiable E-Voting Scheme without Tallying Authorities

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Title of host publicationESORICS 2016:
DateAccepted/In press - 27 Jun 2016
DateE-pub ahead of print - 15 Sep 2016
DatePublished (current) - 2016
Pages223-240
Number of pages13
Place of PublicationSwitzerland
Volume9879
Original languageEnglish
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-45741-3

Abstract

Nearly all verifiable e-voting schemes require trustworthy authorities to perform the tallying operations. An exception is the DRE-i system which removes this requirement by pre-computing all encrypted ballots before the election using random factors that will later cancel out and allow the public to verify the tally after the election. While the removal of tallying authorities significantly simplifies election management, the pre-computation of ballots necessitates secure ballot storage, as leakage of precomputed ballots endangers voter privacy. In this paper, we address this problem and propose DRE-ip (DRE-i with enhanced privacy). Adopting a different design strategy, DRE-ip is able to encrypt ballots in real time in such a way that the election tally can be publicly verified without decrypting the cast ballots. As a result, DRE-ip achieves end-to-end verifiability without tallying authorities, similar to DRE-i, but with a significantly stronger guarantee on voter privacy. In the event that the voting machine is fully compromised, the assurance on tallying integrity remains intact and the information leakage is limited to the minimum: only the partial tally at the time of compromise is leaked.

    Research areas

  • ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM, privacy, verifiability, verifiable e-voting, ballot secrecy

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