Ecological Personhood: A Bridging Approach

Monica Brito Vieira; Sean Fleming

Ecological Personhood: A Bridging Approach

Politics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Aotearoa New Zealand’s recognition of the Whanganui River as a legal person in 2017 has generated a lively debate. While advocates argue that ascribing personhood to natural entities is a powerful tool for redressing historical injustices against Indigenous peoples and for protecting the environment, critics argue that it is incompatible with Western legal and political systems. In this article, we use Thomas Hobbes’s theory of personhood to develop a novel account of ecological personhood. Hobbes explains how natural entities can be empowered to speak and act through authorized representatives, much as states, corporations, and wards do. Our Hobbesian account has three main payoffs. First, it offers a bridge between different legal orders and ontologies of nature. Second, it explains how “ecoship” is normatively different from corporate personhood and guardianship. Third, it highlights both the transformative potential of ecological persons and the ways in which they can be coopted and subverted.

Original language	English
Journal	American Political Science Review
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 30 Apr 2025

Bibliographical note

This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the University’s Research Publications and Open Access policy.

Embargoed Document

Accepted manuscript
Accepted author manuscript, 3.62 MB
Licence: CC BY
Embargo ends: 31/12/99

Cite this

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AB - Aotearoa New Zealand’s recognition of the Whanganui River as a legal person in 2017 has generated a lively debate. While advocates argue that ascribing personhood to natural entities is a powerful tool for redressing historical injustices against Indigenous peoples and for protecting the environment, critics argue that it is incompatible with Western legal and political systems. In this article, we use Thomas Hobbes’s theory of personhood to develop a novel account of ecological personhood. Hobbes explains how natural entities can be empowered to speak and act through authorized representatives, much as states, corporations, and wards do. Our Hobbesian account has three main payoffs. First, it offers a bridge between different legal orders and ontologies of nature. Second, it explains how “ecoship” is normatively different from corporate personhood and guardianship. Third, it highlights both the transformative potential of ecological persons and the ways in which they can be coopted and subverted.

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