By the same authors

From the same journal

From the same journal

Economic geography and the regulatory state: Asymmetric marketization of social housing in England

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Economic geography and the regulatory state : Asymmetric marketization of social housing in England. / Clegg, Liam Simon.

In: Environment and Planning A, Vol. 51, No. 7, 28.05.2019, p. 1479-98.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Clegg, LS 2019, 'Economic geography and the regulatory state: Asymmetric marketization of social housing in England', Environment and Planning A, vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 1479-98.

APA

Clegg, L. S. (Accepted/In press). Economic geography and the regulatory state: Asymmetric marketization of social housing in England. Environment and Planning A, 51(7), 1479-98.

Vancouver

Clegg LS. Economic geography and the regulatory state: Asymmetric marketization of social housing in England. Environment and Planning A. 2019 May 28;51(7):1479-98.

Author

Clegg, Liam Simon. / Economic geography and the regulatory state : Asymmetric marketization of social housing in England. In: Environment and Planning A. 2019 ; Vol. 51, No. 7. pp. 1479-98.

Bibtex - Download

@article{4b694c4ba787436b82673e438ea8e4b5,
title = "Economic geography and the regulatory state: Asymmetric marketization of social housing in England",
abstract = "The 2011 Affordable Homes Programme (AHP) introduced dramatic reductions in the level of government grant for new-build construction by Housing Associations, with an expectation that Associations{\textquoteright} rents would rise towards market rates to compensate. Through this paper, I explore London-based Associations{\textquoteright} use of cross-subsidy from commercial sale and rental operations to ameliorate the push towards higher rents for social housing. I characterise the spatially-variegated response to the as AHP {\textquoteleft}asymmetric marketisation{\textquoteright}. The case illustrates the value of bridging between Economic Geography literatures that acknowledge spatial variation in state-market constellations but offers less developed insights on modes of marketisation, and Political Science literature on the regulatory state that offers a useful framework for disaggregating between modes of marketization but which has overlooked the issue of spatial variation. The significance of this asymmetric marketization is heightened by ongoing concerns over the sustainability of London-based Housing Associations{\textquoteright} commercial activities, and by the possible extension of commercial-to-social cross-subsidisation across other national housing systems.",
author = "Clegg, {Liam Simon}",
note = "This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher{\textquoteright}s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. ",
year = "2019",
month = may,
day = "28",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "1479--98",
journal = "Environment and Planning A",
issn = "1472-3409",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "7",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Economic geography and the regulatory state

T2 - Asymmetric marketization of social housing in England

AU - Clegg, Liam Simon

N1 - This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

PY - 2019/5/28

Y1 - 2019/5/28

N2 - The 2011 Affordable Homes Programme (AHP) introduced dramatic reductions in the level of government grant for new-build construction by Housing Associations, with an expectation that Associations’ rents would rise towards market rates to compensate. Through this paper, I explore London-based Associations’ use of cross-subsidy from commercial sale and rental operations to ameliorate the push towards higher rents for social housing. I characterise the spatially-variegated response to the as AHP ‘asymmetric marketisation’. The case illustrates the value of bridging between Economic Geography literatures that acknowledge spatial variation in state-market constellations but offers less developed insights on modes of marketisation, and Political Science literature on the regulatory state that offers a useful framework for disaggregating between modes of marketization but which has overlooked the issue of spatial variation. The significance of this asymmetric marketization is heightened by ongoing concerns over the sustainability of London-based Housing Associations’ commercial activities, and by the possible extension of commercial-to-social cross-subsidisation across other national housing systems.

AB - The 2011 Affordable Homes Programme (AHP) introduced dramatic reductions in the level of government grant for new-build construction by Housing Associations, with an expectation that Associations’ rents would rise towards market rates to compensate. Through this paper, I explore London-based Associations’ use of cross-subsidy from commercial sale and rental operations to ameliorate the push towards higher rents for social housing. I characterise the spatially-variegated response to the as AHP ‘asymmetric marketisation’. The case illustrates the value of bridging between Economic Geography literatures that acknowledge spatial variation in state-market constellations but offers less developed insights on modes of marketisation, and Political Science literature on the regulatory state that offers a useful framework for disaggregating between modes of marketization but which has overlooked the issue of spatial variation. The significance of this asymmetric marketization is heightened by ongoing concerns over the sustainability of London-based Housing Associations’ commercial activities, and by the possible extension of commercial-to-social cross-subsidisation across other national housing systems.

M3 - Article

VL - 51

SP - 1479

EP - 1498

JO - Environment and Planning A

JF - Environment and Planning A

SN - 1472-3409

IS - 7

ER -