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Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns

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Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns. / McLean, Elena V.; Hinkkainen, Kaisa H.; De la Calle, Luis; Bapat, Navin A.

In: Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, 01.07.2018, p. 378-401.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

McLean, EV, Hinkkainen, KH, De la Calle, L & Bapat, NA 2018, 'Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns', Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 378-401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216635023

APA

McLean, E. V., Hinkkainen, K. H., De la Calle, L., & Bapat, N. A. (2018). Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35(4), 378-401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216635023

Vancouver

McLean EV, Hinkkainen KH, De la Calle L, Bapat NA. Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 2018 Jul 1;35(4):378-401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216635023

Author

McLean, Elena V. ; Hinkkainen, Kaisa H. ; De la Calle, Luis ; Bapat, Navin A. / Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns. In: Conflict Management and Peace Science. 2018 ; Vol. 35, No. 4. pp. 378-401.

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@article{059a9758264d46fa9f79529e6c2eb950,
title = "Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns",
abstract = "Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoretical and empirical examination that explores how the imposition of sanctions affects the dynamics of ongoing terrorist campaigns in the targeted state. We argue that comprehensive sanctions that are imposed on targets that are fighting transnational terrorists within their territory should make these groups more resistant to collapse. However, similar sanctions imposed against states that serve as “home bases” or sanctuaries to terrorists should shorten the lifespan of these groups. Our empirical analysis yields results largely supportive of these theoretical expectations.",
keywords = "Economic sanctions, transnational terrorism",
author = "McLean, {Elena V.} and Hinkkainen, {Kaisa H.} and {De la Calle}, Luis and Bapat, {Navin A.}",
year = "2018",
month = "7",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0738894216635023",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "378--401",
journal = "Conflict Management and Peace Science",
issn = "0738-8942",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",
number = "4",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns

AU - McLean, Elena V.

AU - Hinkkainen, Kaisa H.

AU - De la Calle, Luis

AU - Bapat, Navin A.

PY - 2018/7/1

Y1 - 2018/7/1

N2 - Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoretical and empirical examination that explores how the imposition of sanctions affects the dynamics of ongoing terrorist campaigns in the targeted state. We argue that comprehensive sanctions that are imposed on targets that are fighting transnational terrorists within their territory should make these groups more resistant to collapse. However, similar sanctions imposed against states that serve as “home bases” or sanctuaries to terrorists should shorten the lifespan of these groups. Our empirical analysis yields results largely supportive of these theoretical expectations.

AB - Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. However, this argument has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. This study presents a theoretical and empirical examination that explores how the imposition of sanctions affects the dynamics of ongoing terrorist campaigns in the targeted state. We argue that comprehensive sanctions that are imposed on targets that are fighting transnational terrorists within their territory should make these groups more resistant to collapse. However, similar sanctions imposed against states that serve as “home bases” or sanctuaries to terrorists should shorten the lifespan of these groups. Our empirical analysis yields results largely supportive of these theoretical expectations.

KW - Economic sanctions

KW - transnational terrorism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85048237366&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/20110/

U2 - 10.1177/0738894216635023

DO - 10.1177/0738894216635023

M3 - Article

VL - 35

SP - 378

EP - 401

JO - Conflict Management and Peace Science

JF - Conflict Management and Peace Science

SN - 0738-8942

IS - 4

ER -