Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge

Konstantinos Koufopoulos, Aristotelis Boukouras

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multidimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the realized frequency of types (the exact number of agents for each type) is common knowledge, then a mechanism exists, which is consistent with truthful revelation of private information and which implements first-best allocations of resources as the unique equilibrium. The result requires the single-crossing property on utility functions and the anonymity of the Pareto correspondence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)75–98
Number of pages24
JournalEconomic theory
Issue number1
Early online date14 Jul 2016
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2017

Bibliographical note

© The Author(s) 2016


  • Adverse selection
  • First-best
  • Full implementation
  • Mechanism design
  • Single-crossing property

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