Efficient kidney exchange with dichotomous preferences

Yao Cheng; Zaifu Yang

doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102536

Efficient kidney exchange with dichotomous preferences

Yao Cheng, Zaifu Yang

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies a general kidney exchange model with compatible patient-donor pairs, incompatible patient-donor pairs, single donors, and patients on the waiting list. We derive an explicit formula of the maximal number of feasible kidney transplants under several sizes of cycles and chains of exchange, analyze the effect of different ways of exchange on efficiency, and provide substantial simulation results based on the USA data. Our results further show that kidney ex- change can be decentralized for relatively large populations, and that allowing compatible pairs and single donors to exchange with incompatible pairs can significantly increase the number of feasible kidney transplants. A more general model of two-category type-compatible exchanges is also established.

Original language	English
Article number	102536
Number of pages	25
Journal	Journal of Health Economics
Volume	80
Early online date	25 Sept 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102536
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2021

Bibliographical note

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10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102536

Kidney Exchange Cheng-Yang 2021 accepted version
© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy.
Accepted author manuscript, 386 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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