Emotional Intentionality

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship to the localized content of an emotional experience.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)251-269
JournalRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
Publication statusPublished - 20 Aug 2019

Bibliographical note

© The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2019. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

Cite this