Emotional Intentionality

Matthew James Ratcliffe

doi:10.1017/S1358246118000784

Emotional Intentionality

Matthew James Ratcliffe

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship to the localized content of an emotional experience.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	251-269
Journal	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
Volume	85
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246118000784
Publication status	Published - 20 Aug 2019

Bibliographical note

© The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2019. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

Access to Document

10.1017/S1358246118000784

Emotional Intentionality Draft 2 July 2018
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2019. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.
Accepted author manuscript, 128 KBLicence: Other

Cite this

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