Exorcising Grice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals

Simon W Townsend; Sonja E Koski; Richard W Byrne; Katie E Slocombe; Balthasar Bickel; Markus Boeckle; Ines Braga Goncalves; Judith M Burkart; Tom Flower; Florence Gaunet; Hans Johann Glock; Thibaud Gruber; David A W A M Jansen; Katja Liebal; Angelika Linke; Ádám Miklósi; Richard Moore; Carel P van Schaik; Sabine Stoll; Alex Vail; Bridget M Waller; Markus Wild; Klaus Zuberbühler; Marta B Manser

doi:10.1111/brv.12289

Exorcising Grice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals

Simon W Townsend, Sonja E Koski, Richard W Byrne, Katie E Slocombe, Balthasar Bickel, Markus Boeckle, Ines Braga Goncalves, Judith M Burkart, Tom Flower, Florence Gaunet, Hans Johann Glock, Thibaud Gruber, David A W A M Jansen, Katja Liebal, Angelika Linke, Ádám Miklósi, Richard Moore, Carel P van Schaik, Sabine Stoll, Alex VailBridget M Waller, Markus Wild, Klaus Zuberbühler, Marta B Manser

Psychology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Language's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-7
Number of pages	7
Journal	Biological reviews of the cambridge philosophical society
Early online date	2 Aug 2016
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/brv.12289
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 2 Aug 2016

Bibliographical note

© 2016, Cambridge Philosophical Society. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

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10.1111/brv.12289

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© 2016, Cambridge Philosophical Society. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.
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Cite this

Townsend, S. W., Koski, S. E., Byrne, R. W., Slocombe, K. E., Bickel, B., Boeckle, M., Braga Goncalves, I., Burkart, J. M., Flower, T., Gaunet, F., Glock, H. J., Gruber, T., Jansen, D. A. W. A. M., Liebal, K., Linke, A., Miklósi, Á., Moore, R., van Schaik, C. P., Stoll, S., ... Manser, M. B. (2016). Exorcising Grice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals. Biological reviews of the cambridge philosophical society, 1-7. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/brv.12289

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abstract = "Language's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans.",

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Townsend, SW, Koski, SE, Byrne, RW, Slocombe, KE, Bickel, B, Boeckle, M, Braga Goncalves, I, Burkart, JM, Flower, T, Gaunet, F, Glock, HJ, Gruber, T, Jansen, DAWAM, Liebal, K, Linke, A, Miklósi, Á, Moore, R, van Schaik, CP, Stoll, S, Vail, A, Waller, BM, Wild, M, Zuberbühler, K & Manser, MB 2016, 'Exorcising Grice's ghost: an empirical approach to studying intentional communication in animals', Biological reviews of the cambridge philosophical society, pp. 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1111/brv.12289

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