Explaining impossible and possible imaginings of pain

Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof

doi:10.4453/rifp.2021.0015

Explaining impossible and possible imaginings of pain

Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Jennifer Radden argues that it is impossible to imagine sensuously pain and explains this by 10 noting that pains are sensory qualities for which there is no distinction between appearance and reality. By 11 contrast, I argue that only basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are, with 12 some qualifications, impossible. Non-basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective 13 are possible. I explain the extent to which imagining pain is impossible in terms of the conditions required 14 for representing the painfulness of pain. I outline some difficulties with Radden’s favoured explanation 15 and note how imagining pains may have a role in depression and, to that extent, keep open the option that 16 it may have a partly delusional character.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	173-182
Number of pages	9
Journal	Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
Volume	12
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2021.0015
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2021

Bibliographical note

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10.4453/rifp.2021.0015Licence: CC BY

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© Paul Noordhof 2021
Final published version, 402 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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