Abstract
In this paper I provide an interpretation of Hegel’s account of ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) in the 1802-3 System of Ethical Life as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. In the first three sections of the paper I argue that Fichte’s account of recognition in the domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. I then turn, in section four, to a discussion of Hegel’s critique and transformation of Fichte’s conception of recognition. Hegel’s transformation consists, I argue, in the claim that a comprehensive account of recognition in the domain of right must be concerned with recognition as a moral attitude.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 365-385 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | British Journal for the History of Philosophy |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2009 |
Bibliographical note
This is a preprint of an article submitted for publication in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy, © 2009 British Society for the History of Philosophy.Keywords
- Recognition
- Hegel
- Fichte
- Neuhouser
- Intersubjectivity