Fichte, Hegel, and the Life and Death Struggle

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Abstract

Several commentators have argued that Hegel’s account of ‘self-consciousness’ in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as an ‘immanent critique’ of Fichte’s idealism. If this is correct, it raises the question of whether Hegel’s account of ‘recognition’ in Chapter IV can be interpreted as a critique of Fichte’s conception of recognition as expounded in the Foundations of Natural Right. A satisfactory answer to this question will have to provide a plausible interpretation of the ‘life and death struggle’ as an immanent critique of Fichte’s account of recognition. This paper aims to provide such an interpretation. The first part of the paper provides a discussion of Fichte’s account of recognition that emphasizes its ‘epistemic’ concerns. The second part argues that Hegel’s account of the ‘life and death struggle’ can be read plausibly as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-103
Number of pages23
JournalBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume22
Issue number1
Early online date1 Aug 2013
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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